The ‘Resource Curse’ in Timor-Leste

Tuesday 19 August 2014 9:54am WIB (JoyoNews3)

School of International, Political & Strategic Studies

By CHARLES SCHEINER

Timor-Leste is one of the world’s most petroleum export-dependent countries. Although petroleum revenues and savings benefit many citizens, they also distort economics, public finances, politics and personal behaviour. The phrase ‘resource curse’ is often used to describe how people in nearly every nation which depends on exporting non-renewable resources become worse off than people not ‘blessed’ with mineral and oil wealth. This In Brief describes how the ‘resource curse’ will lead to devastating consequences in Timor-Leste unless the state moves quickly to diversify and strengthen the non-oil economy. It is based on analysis by La’o Hamutuk, a civil society organisation which has researched policies and outcomes in Timor-Leste since 2001.

Oil Swamps the Economy

Timor-Leste’s oil and gas reserves are limited, and its petroleum dependency results from its very small nonpetroleum economy. Timor-Leste’s gross domestic product (GDP) was US$4.5 billion in 2011, of which 77 per cent (%) was from the petroleum sector, with most of the remainder driven by state spending. Although political leaders proclaim that ‘non-oil GDP’ has grown at ‘double-digit rates’, this obscures the fact that productive sectors ­ agriculture and manufacturing ­ comprise only 4% of GDP and have not increased significantly since 2002. All the growth in ‘non-oil GDP’ comes from the state spending oil money: public administration, infrastructure construction, and supplying goods and services to the government.

Timor-Leste’s oil wealth is leaking out rapidly. In 2013, Timor-Leste spent US$535 million on imported goods, while non-oil exports totalled only US$16 million, nearly all coffee. Similarly, US$627 million was paid for overseas services in 2013, while most of the US$45 million in service ‘exports’ was for tickets on international airlines. Many consumer products which could be produced in Timor-Leste are imported, including chickens from Brazil, rice from Vietnam, eggs from Singapore, water from Indonesia, and fruit juice from Cyprus and Holland.

Exacerbating petroleum dependency, the developed formal economy employs less than one-third of the working-age population: 9% work for companies (half of which depend on state contracts); 10% work for the state directly and 8% work for themselves (as taxi drivers, or market, street or kiosk vendors, for example); 36% are subsistence farmers or fisher-people; another 34% are not working; and 3% are students, overseas, or working for agencies. When the oil is gone, jobs and imports will disappear, and productive private sectors will have to fill the gaps in livelihoods and necessities.

Oil Fuels the State Machinery

Money from converting Timor-Leste’s oil and gas wealth into dollars sustains the state. During 2014, the Ministry of Finance projects that 61% of state revenues will come from oil and gas exports. Another 32% will be from investing past petroleum income, with only 7% from non-oil sources. Timor-Leste’s business taxes are very low, because little importance is given to nonoil revenues.

Oil revenues peaked in 2012. After five years of rapid budget escalation, spending moderated in 2013 due to infrastructure delays, but will resurge if political leaders carry out their plans. Recurrent expenditures (salaries, goods, services, public grants) grew about 20% per year between 2008 and 2014. Although health and education are gradually getting more, Timor-Leste still invests 40% less on them than well-managed developing countries. Timor-Leste’s post-1999 ‘baby boom’ are not getting adequate nutrition or education, which will have long-lasting consequences. Agriculture receives only US$34 million (2% of state spending), while veterans get US$87 million in pensions and more in preferential contracts and scholarships.

Timor-Leste created its Petroleum Fund in 2005 to serve as a buffer between fluctuating oil income and the annual state budget. All petroleum revenues go into the fund, and money is withdrawn to fill the budget deficit. Returns from the fund’s investments were intended to replace oil revenues after the fields run dry. Guidelines for annual withdrawal were meant to provide a constant revenue flow indefinitely, but they have been exceeded almost every year.

The Resource Curse Has Many Faces

Timor-Leste has prevented some impacts of the resource curse. By using an international currency, it has moderated inflation and partially hedged against currency exchange fluctuations. Despite this, inflation continues because there are more dollars than goods. Oil operations bring other problems, including the amorality of international oil companies, environmental destruction, and their capital-intensive, high-skill nature. Timor-Leste’s size, poverty, and recent emergence from occupation and war exacerbate the damage.

These factors, combined with human behaviour, make it almost impossible to develop a sustainable, equitable economy. In all democracies, politicians seek results before the next election, and oil income allows leaders to replace long-term planning with dreams and promises. Megaprojects like Tasi Mane and the Oecusse Special Economic Zone ignore economic viability while exaggerating job and spin-off prospects. In search of quick results, policymakers neglect poverty reduction, import substitution and food sovereignty.

With US$16 billion in the Petroleum Fund, decision-makers see money as the universal solution ­ purchasing short-term substitutes for a few is easier than creating durable results for everyone. For instance, the state spends 35% more on overseas scholarships than on its national university, which has four times as many students. While some well-connected citizens fly to overseas hospitals at public expense, most people cannot access decent health care. While roads and bridges for VIP visitors to Dili are frequently rebuilt, rural infrastructure is missing or neglected. Airports, highways and ports will consume over a billion dollars, yet very few Timorese people fly or own cars. When the oil is gone, Timor-Leste will be unable to cover the eight-fold increase in trade deficit predicted by port planners, or to repay lenders.

In addition, special interest groups ­ veterans, contractors, people displaced by the 2006 unrest, former office holders, soldiers who deserted, political party leaders ­ claim privileged entitlement to public funds. Since there are few taxpayer voters to demand that their money be used prudently or honestly, money is often diverted, misdirected or wasted.

Petroleum usurps attention and resources from sustainable, realisable plans. Oil attracts the most persuasive, creative and ambitious people, leading to a brain drain from more productive or service-oriented professions. The talented oil advocates persuade decision-makers to pay for flashy concept studies, leading to billion-dollar proposals. When they compete against ideas for farming, schools, clinics, tourism, food processing or light industry, the playing field is tilted.

Few leaders anywhere have the foresight and courage to overcome such challenges.

The Future is Predictable Development of Greater Sunrise oil and gas is stalled due to disputes with Australia over maritime boundaries and with the oil companies, who want to liquefy the natural gas at sea, rather than pipe it to Timor-Leste. Even if this project proceeds with an LNG plant in Timor-Leste, total oil and gas revenues will average US$1 per person per day for four decades, about one-third of the 2014 budget.

With half of Greater Sunrise, Timor-Leste has about 800 barrels per citizen in known oil and gas reserves, 30% less than Australia. This will last 14 years at 2012 production rates. Although petroleum officials promise that large fields await discovery, the country’s constrained area, geology and 120 years of exploration make this unlikely.

By modelling current trends, external factors and policy choices, one can anticipate future outcomes. A ‘best-guess’ scenario, too optimistic for prudent planning, shows that spending will exceed revenue in 2019, and the Petroleum Fund will start to shrink (Scheiner in press). It will be empty by 2026, before today’s toddlers finish secondary school, and state spending will have to be cut by two-thirds. If the non-oil economy hasn’t developed by then, many more will join the swelling majority who live below the poverty line.

This can only be avoided by rapidly moving toward sustainable, equitable development: increasing food production, cutting wasteful spending and cancelling unviable megaprojects. Timor-Leste must fortify its strongest resource ­ its people ­ by investing in education, nutrition and health care.

Timorese people proved their unity and persistence during the long struggle for political sovereignty, but economic sovereignty may be even harder to achieve.



Charles Scheiner is a researcher with La’o Hamutuk, the Timor-Leste Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis. The article this In Brief is adapted from, includes a reference list.



Endnote
1. La’o Hamutuk’s analysis uses data from the Timor-Leste government and international agencies.

Reference
Scheiner, C. in press. How Long Will the Petroleum Fund Carry Timor-Leste? Timor-Leste Studies Association.

http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/publications/%E2%80%98resource-curse%E2%80%99-timor-leste-0

For more informations, you can have a look to this extensive article from La'o Hamutuk's website, "Can the Petroleum Fund Exorcise the Resource Curse from Timor-Leste?"
and also to this interview of Ravij Biwas, "Over-reliance on oil and gaz treathens East-Timor economy"

Raùl ma poule (2011)

Raùl ma poule est un film documentaire sur une librairie indépendante à Ivry, en région parisienne, "Envie de lire". Le lieu est atypique et fonctionne, grâce à la détermination des libraires à ne pas faire des lecteurs des clients ni du livre un produit. La dimension reste humaine et la qualité est au rendez-vous. Le docu donne l'idée d'une journée sur les lieux, entre les lecteurs de tous âges et les représentants, le café du matin et la caisse du soir.

Qu'est-ce que disait Godard exactement déjà ? Quelque chose comme : "Je crois que ce qu'il y a de plus extraordinaire à filmer, ce sont les gens qui lisent."

Réalisé par Anne-Lise Garat, Marie Henry, Mia Kraitsovits-Pélage et Loeiz Perreux en 2011, dans le cadre des ateliers cinéma de l'université Paris VII.

[Raùl ma poule sur Viméo]

Géopolitique de la traduction [en sciences humaines] (Gisèle Sapiro)

Alors que les japonais classent les anglophones parmi les meilleures universités du monde, que faire de la diversité linguistique, notamment en sciences humaines ?  Gisèle Sapiro propose un rapide coup d'œil sur la traduction des sciences humaines dans le monde, choix, méthodes, approches : http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Geopolitique-de-la-traduction.html

"Mais dans les sciences humaines et sociales, outre qu’il y a une inégalité devant la langue anglaise qui ne pourrait être réduite qu’à condition de restructurer tout le système éducatif autour de cette langue dès la prime enfance, il y a des avantages épistémologiques au passage d’une langue à l’autre car la traduction nous permet de relativiser nos catégories d’analyse, fortement ancrées dans les cultures nationales du fait des conditions d’institutionnalisation de ces disciplines à partir de la fin du 19e siècle."

Commonwealth

"Combien de luttes victorieuses pour la libération nationale ont mené à la construction d'États postcoloniaux qui ne font que perpétuer les rapports capitalistes de payvreté et de maîtrise fondés sur une élite acceptant ainsi que la nation soit maintenue au bas de la hiérarchie globale et que de large portions de leur population soient condamnées à vivre dans la misère ?" 
(HARDT & NEGRI, Commonwealth, Gallimard, 2012, p. 178)

Lettre ouverte concernant la compagnie pétrolière TimorGAP

L'association La'o Hamutuk, Institut du Timor Oriental pour la Surveillance et l'Analyse du Développement, a adressé une lettre ouverte au Président de la Cour d'Appel, ainsi qu'au Parlement, à la Commission Anti-Corruption et à la Commission pour les Droits de l'Homme et la Justice, afin de demander un audit et une enquête concernant les agissements de la compagnie nationale pétrolière TimorGAP. La'o Hamutuk soupçonne la compagnie, créée en 2011, d'avoir pu "commettre des violations de la loi, [être coupable] de mauvaise administration, de mauvaise gestion, et de corruption potentielle, ainsi que d'ignorer ses obligations légales d'accountability et de transparence". [Je ne traduis pas "accountability" ; il s'agit de la responsabilité à laquelle engage toute influence, de quelque nature qu'elle soit.]

Le texte complet en anglais est joint ci-dessous, voici un résumé à destination du public francophone :

La'o Hamutuk dénonce la non-publication du rapport annuel de la compagnie, en rappelant qu'il n'est ainsi pas possible de savoir ce qu'il est advenu des $13,3 millions versé par l'état, des $8,4 millions de contrat versé par le Fond Infrastructure et de la centaine de millions de dollars qu'implique le projet Tasi Mane [lien (en anglais) vers un descriptif du projet Tasi Mane par La'o Matumuk]. En outre, l'assocation rappelle qu'il est important de faire le point avant l'engagement dans le Consortium du Pétrole de la CPLP [Communauté des Pays de Langue Portugaise, dont le sommet s'est tenu à Dili fin juillet], avant le début de la construction de la Base de Ressource Suai et avant que ne soient signés les contrats pour la raffinerie Betano et l'autoroute de la côte Sud.

L'association suggère plusieurs approches afin de clarifier les agissements de la compagnie pétrolière : 

• mettre au clair les transferts d'argent public
• surveiller les coûts du projet d'infrastructures Tasi Mane (la construction actuelle de l'aéroport de Suai a commencé sans que les projets de relogement et d'emploi de la communauté n'aient été pour l'instant menés à bien ; de plus, des pressions politiques ont imposé le projet en violation du decret de loi concernant l'environnement, et sans que n'aient lieu ni consultation publique, ni Plan de Gestion Environnementale)
• rendre publiques les offres d'emplois de la compagnie, et exiger plus de transparente quant à la façon dont elle rémunère ses employés
• demander une gestion légale des contrats publics

De plus, La'o Hamutuk exprime ses crainte que l'interraction de TimorGAP avec le commerce international ne pousse la compagnie à placer ses (et leurs) propres intérêts bien avant ceux habitants du Timor Oriental. L'assocation se permet ainsi de rappeler que le Consortium du Pétrole de la CPLP, qui est sur le point d'être créé, comprend la Guinée Équatoriale, "l'un des régimes les plus corrompu, dictatorial, et voleur de pétrole au monde", ainsi que des compagnies pétrolières de mauvaise réputation, comme Sonangol ; que la Malaysian Helicopter Service effectue des pressions sur les compagnies pétrolières pour être leur seul pourvoyeur, tout en faisant montre d'une opacité totale quant à leurs finances et opérations ; que la PTT (la Compagnie Pétrolière Nationale de Thaïlande) a signé un accord avec TimorGAP en 2013, et que cette compagnie a un lourd passif de désastre environnementaux (pollution des eaux du Timor indonésien en 2013, violation des droits communautaires et environnementaux en Thaïlande) ; que la TimorGAP vient de se joindre à une campagne de recherche de pétrole, dont le coût, s'élevant à 10 millions de dollars, pourrait avoir des retombées sur les finances publiques.

Enfin, La'o Hamutuk rappelle que TimorGAP a l'intention de dépenser $3 millions pour exploiter des gissements de gas et de pétrole onshore, sans qu'il soit encore légalement possible de le faire (la législation à ce sujet n'ayant pas encore été adoptée). 
 

* * *

Voici le texte complet en anglais

To:  S.E. Guilhermino da Silva, President of Tribunal de Recurso
        S.E. Vicente Guterres, President of Parliament
        S.E. Carmelita Caetano Moniz, President of Parliament Committee A
        S.E. Virgílio Maria Dias Marçal, President of Parliament Committee C
        S.E. Jacinta Abu Cau Pereira, President of Parliament Committee D
        S.E. Adérito Tilman, Anti-Corruption Commissioner
        S.E. Sebastião Dias Ximenes, Provedor for Human Rights and Justice

Cc:  S.E. Francisco da Costa Monteiro, President of TimorGAP, E.P.
        S.E. Alfredo Pires, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
        Media and public 

Re: Open letter asking for an audit and investigation of TimorGAP, E.P.
Date: 5 August 2014

Dear Excellencies:

We are writing to encourage your agencies to use their legal and Constitutional powers  and investigative capabilities to discover whether an indirect state-owned entity is managing and spending Timor-Leste’s resources for the benefit of our people. We believe that Timor GAP, E.P. may have committed legal violations, maladministration, poor management, and possible corruption, as well as ignoring legal obligations for accountability and transparency.

Three years ago, the RDTL Council of Ministers enacted Decreto-Lei N.º 31/2011 of 27 July,  creating TimorGAP - Timor Gás & Petróleo, E.P. as a state-owned company. Less than three months later, the Council of Ministers approved Resolução do Governo N.° 29/2011 of 5 October, appointing the President of TimorGAP, and the company began operation.

According to Article 27 of Decree-Law 31/2011, TimorGAP is required to present and publish an Annual Report within six months after the end of each year. By now, they should have presented reports for 2011, 2012 and 2013. However, TimorGAP has never submitted an annual report. La’o Hamutuk has asked them about this many times, and TimorGAP said that problems with the internal audit of their GAP-MHS subsidiary prevented publication of these reports for more a year. 

Because TimorGAP has been unable to conduct its own audits, we recommend that the Câmara de Contas should conduct an external audit, either on its own initiative or in response to a Parliamentary request. However, a thorough investigation will take time, as Timor GAP’s records may not be complete or well-organized. Therefore we suggest that the Provedoria and/or Anti-Corruption Commission should also explore whether there is prima facie evidence of maladministration or corruption. If they find such indications, they should look into them more deeply.

TimorGAP’s finances are largely hidden and are “excluded from the consolidated financial statements [the General State Accounts], as they are incorporated under different laws.” However, TimorGAP has already received $13.3 million in public transfers from the State Budget.  They themselves have been awarded $8.4 million worth of contracts from the Infrastructure Fund, and they are entrusted with managing the Tasi Mane project,  which involves hundreds of millions of Timor-Leste’s dollars. We have no information on what they have received or borrowed for the commercial activities of themselves and their subsidiaries, or on any of their expenditures.

It is important to get TimorGAP’s house in order now, before weaknesses in its internal control and accounting systems have more serious consequences for Timor-Leste. In the near future, TimorGAP will become involved with the new CPLP Petroleum Consortium, begin construction of the Suai Supply Base  and contracting for the Betano Refinery and South Coast Highway,  and incur significant expenses for petroleum exploration under Production-Sharing Contract JPDA 11-106.

In order to help this investigation get started, we are listing a few areas which should be explored, and we are eager to share what we know with investigating authorities.

Use and accountability of public transfers

A few months ago, the Tribunal de Recurso issued Audit Report No. 2/2014 on the National Petroleum Authority (ANP), which points out that the transfers to ANP from the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MPRM) are neither transparent nor accountable, a situation which should be rectified (Observation 2.8.3, Conclusion 2.8.2). The same applies to TimorGAP.

TimorGAP receives nearly twice as much in transfers from the State Budget as ANP gets, but these are also concealed in the budget law and supporting documents within public transfers from MPRM, and are not visible in Budget Execution Reports, the Transparency Portal  or the General State Accounts.   The money is considered ‘executed’ when MPRM transfers it to TimorGAP, and disaggregated information on allocation or spending is not available. However, we understand that SERN and MPRM have already provided $13.3 million to TimorGAP as public grants:
    •    $2.0 million in December 2011
    •    $2.3 million in 2012
    •    $4.0 million in 2013
    •    $5.0 million in 2014.
The lack of transparency for the allocation and use of this money violates Article 145.2 of the RDTL Constitution, which prohibits the existence of secret appropriations and funds.

Tasi Mane Project financing, planning and carryovers

According to the Procurement Portal, whose information is often incomplete, Timor-Leste has awarded two contracts to TimorGAP which will be paid out of the Infrastructure Fund:
    •    Contract RDTL 12004523 for $4.9 million, signed 30 May 2011: Detailed geotechnical and marine survey and Front End Engineering Design for the Betano refinery. (This contract was signed before TimorGAP existed as a legal entity.)
    •    Contract RDTL 12005429 for $3.5 million, signed 1 June 2012: Front End Engineering Design for the LNG Marine facility in Beaçu.
TimorGAP has spent or managed much more on Tasi Mane from the Infrastructure Fund, according to the Budget Execution Portal  and Book 6 of the 2014 General State Budget.
    •    2011: $  8.7 million executed.
    •    2012: $  9.7 million executed.
    •    2013: $  5.7 million executed.
    •    2014: $21.1 million executed or obligated to date.  $25.2 million more is allocated for 2014.
    •    2015-2018: $319 million expected. However, this does not include many components of the Tasi Mane Project and could increase to several billion dollars if the following, some of which are already out for tender, are carried out.
    ◦    Construction of the South Coast highway
    ◦    Detailed design and construction of the Betano Refinery
    ◦    Detailed design and construction of the Beaçu LNG plant
    ◦    Design and construction of the Sunrise gas pipeline
Although some of these expenses may be paid by foreign investors, doubts about the profitability of these facilities could oblige Timor-Leste to guarantee or finance a large portion of their costs.

Implementation of the TimorGAP-managed Tasi Mane project is also problematic:
    •    More than a year ago, TimorGAP and MPRM told local residents near the Suai Supply Base to ‘liberate’ their land, but no construction contract has been awarded, although five companies were prequalified last November. Communities are confused about compensation and relocation.
    •    Suai airport construction has already begun, provoking anger and controversy in the local community as their expectations for compensation and jobs have not been met. Timor-Leste’s highest officials have had to intervene, and the Indonesian contractor has been unable to work. Last week, an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on 29 July approved an emergency resolution to ‘unblock’ the development of the Suai Supply Base and airport by settling disagreements with the local population about land use, in an effort to untangle problems created by TimorGAP’s mishandling of these issues.
    •    The National Procurement Commission invited bids in April 2013 for the first segment of the South Coast Highway, but no contract has yet been awarded.
    •    Two weeks ago, the National Procurement Commission issued RFP/ICB/045/MPRM-2014 for a pre-Front End Engineering Design for the LNG Plant in Beaçu. Given the uncertainty about when and whether Greater Sunrise gas will be piped to Timor-Leste, this seems premature.
    •    Last year, Environmental License No 02/C:A-1/SSE-MCIE/VI/2013  for the Suai Supply Base was granted in violation of Articles 8(a-b), 9.1(h), 10.1(a-b), 11 and other provisions of Environmental Licensing Decree-Law 5/201,  as no Environmental Management Plan was presented and no public consultations took place. Political pressures overrode legal obligations, and we hope that these irregularities will be investigated and reversed.

Financial management

Although TimorGAP occasionally publishes tender notices in local newspapers, such as the one for cleaners and security published last week,  most of its larger purchases and hiring are done without public announcement or open bidding. Perhaps because TimorGAP is outside the State’s normal procurement regime, its contract announcements and awards do not appear on the Procurement Portal. It would be important to have a better understanding of how such items as consultants, travel and purchases are procured, to see whether TimorGAP is averting collusion and getting good value for the people’s money.

Little information is available on how much TimorGAP pays its nearly 100 personnel, who do not follow civil service rules, or on how they are recruited. Last November, TimorGAP told Parliament that it spends about $150,000/month on salaries. TimorGAP pays much more for advisors and consultants than it does on salaries, and also calls some of its expenditures ‘overhead,’ so we cannot determine the cost of the compensation their people receive. The Tribunal Recurso audit of ANP found many irregularities in this area, and we fear that the ‘entitled petroleum elite’ mindset it exposed may also exist in TimorGAP.

Supplying fuel to EDTL

According to Resolução do Governo N.° 11/2013 of 13 March, TimorGAP was to supply fuel for the Hera Power plant, and on 23 April 2013 the Council of Ministers referred a contract with them to the Tribunal Recurso. On 8 May, TimorGAP announced the opening of a temporary fuel terminal and delivery of the first shipment. However, the process did not work out as expected, and the Ministry of Public Works had to purchase $40 million worth of generator fuel from Esperança Timor Oan on an emergency, single-source basis.

We have been told that the principal obstacle to TimorGAP’s supplying fuel for EDTL was that TimorGAP wanted to use its status as a State-owned institution as an implicit guarantee to foreign suppliers so that they would extend credit, rather than the normal practice of requiring cash on delivery. TimorGAP preferred a brief interagency MOU with EDTL for this transaction worth more than $50 million, rather than a normal contract which would protect Timor-Leste’s interests by spelling out who is responsible for what. After several months of negotiations, TimorGAP and other State agencies failed to reach agreement, and the effort was dropped. We believe that TimorGAP sold the fuel it had already brought to Hera to ETO, and never had financial transactions with EDTL, but this was not mentioned in TimorGAP’s report to Parliament six months later.

This experience indicates that TimorGAP may not give adequate attention to proper contracting procedures, and thereby may fail to sufficiently safeguard Timor-Leste’s rights. The Court of Appeals has done preventive review of some Tasi Mane Project contracts and required revisions before they could be submitted to the Council of Ministers. An audit report on TimorGAP should ensure that the company does not shortcut good practice in its governance and, more importantly, in arrangements with foreign entities who may try to obtain more than their fair share of Timor-Leste’s wealth.

Relations and obligations with other institutions

TimorGAP is involved with a variety of international businesses, all of whom place their own interests before those of the people of Timor-Leste. The history of the global petroleum industry is filled with examples of greed, corruption, human rights violations and outright theft. We are concerned that TimorGAP’s inexperience, haste or eagerness to be accepted as a major international player could place Timor-Leste’s assets and credibility at needless risk. We encourage auditors and investigators to look into such arrangements, including the following:
    •    The CPLP petroleum consortium which is about to be created. This will include Equatorial Guinea, one of the most corrupt, dictatorial and petroleum-stealing regimes in the world, as well as national oil companies with a long record of malfeasance, like Sonangol. TimorGAP’s decision-making and management processes must protect Timor-Leste from being infected by such bad practices.
    •    Malaysian Helicopter Services (MHS) has been in a joint venture with TimorGAP for several years, and we have heard reports of undue pressure on oil companies to use them as a supplier, as well as a total opacity about their finances and operations. TimorGAP told La’o Hamutuk that poor accounting by their GAP-MHS subsidiary has been the main obstacle to completing their audits and annual reports.
    •    PTT, Thailand’s National Oil Company, has had unpublished arrangements with SERN since 2009 regarding the proposed oil refinery in Betano, including a ‘Joint Trading Agreement and Joint Cooperation Agreement’ signed with TimorGAP early in 2013. This is the same company that operated the Montara oil rig in the Timor Sea, where a disastrous spill a few years ago contaminated West Timor’s coastline, probably including Oecusse. PTT has a history of violating local community and environmental rights in Thailand. According to the ‘SDP Matrix’ presented to the Development Partners Meeting last month, a Final Investment Decision will be made on this project by the end of 2014.
    •    The JPDA PSC 11-106 joint venture, of which TimorGAP is a 24% shareholder, is about to begin an offshore drilling campaign. TimorGAP’s share of the costs could be tens of millions of dollars. If TimorGAP borrows from its JV partners or other financers and the project turns out to be non-commercial (as the great majority of exploratory oil and gas projects do), who will be responsible for the debt?

Finally, we encourage you to look into TimorGAP’s intention to spend $3 million for onshore oil and gas exploration this year. This would be an extralegal project, since neither the Mining Law nor the ANP Onshore regulations or model onshore PSC have yet been adopted. TimorGAP created many problems by their rush to ‘liberate’ land in Suai before legal expropriation regimes were in force, and we hope that similar illegal haste does commence onshore exploration without proper laws, regulations and guidelines. Potential environmental and community disruption from oil and gas drilling is far more serious than that from Suai’s port, warehouses and airport.

La’o Hamutuk appreciates your attention to these concerns, and we would be pleased to collaborate in whatever ways we can. Unfortunately, we do not have the capacity to compel evidence or examine internal records or practices that Parliament, the Tribunal Recurso, Provedoria and Anti-Corruption Commission have. We wish you well as you undertake this technically and politically challenging investigation, and are confident that your work will protect and improve the financial, governance and economic well-being of the people of Timor-Leste.

Obrigado barak,
/s/
Juvinal Dias, Adilson da Costa, Celestino Gusmão, Charles Scheiner, Cristiana Ximenes Belo
Natural Resources and Economy Team, La’o Hamutuk
***********************************************************
La'o Hamutuk (The Timor-Leste Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis)
P.O. Box 340, Dili, Timor-Leste (East Timor)
Telephone:  +670-3321040 or +670-7723-4330 mobile
email: laohamutuk@gmail.com    website: http://www.laohamutuk.org    blog: http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/

O dia Mastroianni (João Paulo Cuenca, 2007)

"Est appelé "Mastroianni" (de Marcello, act. it., 1924-1996) le jour perdu en excursions festives à flâner en compagnies de belles filles [...]. Pour le "Jour Mastroianni" classique, le trio, les lunettes noires et, de préférence, le chapeau, sont essentiels. Certains lexicographes inclus également dans leurs définitions l'auto-panégérique compulsif, l'ingestion de dry martini et / ou de gin-tonic, des paris sur des courses de chevaux, de légères crises métaphysiques et la présence à des rondes ou à des fêtes auxquelles l'on n'a pas été auparavant invité."

* * *

Les chapitres du livre correspondent aux heures qui passent, et dans leurs intervalles se glissent des voix étranges, des introspections difficilement compréhensibles, un monde inaccessible. L'errance dure une journée et une nuit. 

Le narrateur (Pedro Cassava), paraît tout savoir - à moins qu'il n'invente ? - et entraîne de bar en bar son ami Tomas Anselmo et sa compagne Maria. Ce sont des pique-assiettes opportunistes, des profiteurs de restaurant chics ; ils traînent dans un monde détaché de toute préoccupation qui ne soit sexuelle ou personnellement existentielle. On y croise des artistes errant eux aussi : un écrivain, une actrice sur le retour.

Les descriptions rappellent le monde cinématographique : découragement de s'aventurer dans un milieu fermé, suggestions et appels constant au connaissances cinéphiles du lecteur. À la fin du livre, le narrateur ferme les yeux et son monde, projeté, disparaît.

1989 : Irak

En 1989, l'Irak sort de 8 ans de guerre contre l'Iran (première guerre du Golfe, 1980-1988). La situation politique du pays pousse, depuis 1970, de nombreux irakien à l'exil dans d'autres régions du monde. En 1990 débute la seconde guerre du Golfe contre le Koweït (1990-1991) et l'embargo international sur l'Irak. Les candidats à l'exil se multiplient, parmi lesquels se trouvent surtout des chiites, des chrétiens (dont de nombreux Assyriens) et des kurdes.

En mars 1988, a lieu le bombardement aux armes chimiques de Halabja, au kurdistan irakien, suite à la prise de la ville par les peshmergas de l'UPK (Union Patriotique du Kurdistan). Sont dénombrés environ 5 000 victimes. Ces bombardements et l'opération Anfal, qui vise à la destruction des villages kurdes, provoquent l'exil d'entre 100 000 et 150 000 kurdes vers les frontières turque et iranienne, où ils sont accueillis dans des camps de réfugiés.

Certains pays européens, dont la France, s'émeuvent de la situation et se proposent d'accueillir des réfugiés kurdes. Dans les faits, 339 kurdes seront accueillis par la France (à travers l'ONG France-Libertés, créée par Danielle Mitterrand) et installés dans des villages auvergnats abandonnés.

Près de 2 millions de kurdes irakiens ont fui l'Irak pendant la seconde guerre du Golfe, mais au moins la moitié d'entre eux retourne en Irak en 1991, encouragé par le développement de la zone autonome du Kurdistan Irakien. La stabilité politique n'y est cependant pas de mise : embargo irakien et international ; pressions turques et irakiennes, guerres tribales entre le PDK et l'UPK, tandis que le PKK de Turquie y a installé de nombreuses bases d'où attaquer l'armée turque.

C'est ce même Kurdistan Irakien qui résiste actuellement à la progression de l'État Islamique en Irak, et qui a profité de la confusion actuelle pour annexer la ville de Kirkouk, depuis longtemps revendiquée par les kurdes.


sources : Abdulkarim Amir. Les Kurdes irakiens en Europe, nouveaux « boat-people ». In: Revue européenne de migrations internationales. Vol. 14 N°1. La ville destabilisée ? Faits et représentations. pp. 263-276.